Constitutional Court's UYAP Decisions

The Constitutional Court's UYAP Decisions Constitute a Violation of the Right of Access to a Court

​

The Constitutional Court (“AYM”) currently applies the “awareness” criterion in calculating the 30-day individual application period. According to Article 47/5 of Law No. 6216 on the Establishment and Judicial Procedures of the Constitutional Court, “An individual application must be filed within thirty days from the date on which all available remedies have been exhausted; if no remedy is prescribed, within thirty days from the date on which the violation is learned.” This provision is also reiterated in Article 64/1 of the Rules of Procedure of the Constitutional Court.

The AYM has rendered several rulings on how the 30-day application period should be calculated based on the specific circumstances of cases. One of the most significant rulings in this regard is the A.C. and Others decision (Application No: 2013/1827). In this decision, the AYM made the following observations on the concept of “awareness”: “Individual applications must be filed within thirty days from the date on which all available remedies have been exhausted; if no remedy is prescribed, within thirty days from the date on which the violation is learned. Although the legislation refers to 'the date of exhaustion of remedies' in cases where a remedy is prescribed, considering that an application cannot be filed without being aware of the matter, this phrase should be understood as 'the date on which the reasoning of the final decision is learned.' Such awareness may occur in different ways depending on the specific circumstances of the case.”

In the later Hüseyin Aşkan ruling, the AYM further elaborated on the concept of awareness, stating: “For the purpose of calculating the commencement of the individual application period, the notification of the reasoned final decision is one form of awareness (…) However, awareness is not limited to notification of the reasoned decision; it can also occur in other ways.” (Hüseyin Aşkan decision, § 23). The AYM further explained that access to UYAP (National Judiciary Informatics System) is one of these alternative methods of awareness, stating: “The Constitutional Court has determined that the applicant’s attorney had access to the final reasoned decision through UYAP and thus had a definite opportunity to learn about the ruling and its reasoning.” (Hüseyin Aşkan decision, § 25).

Following this ruling, the AYM has increasingly examined applicants’ access to UYAP records and has begun automatically dismissing applications that exceed the 30-day deadline, based on the assumption that applicants (or their attorneys) accessed the relevant decision through UYAP. The AYM does not notify applicants of these findings before making a decision, nor does it seek any response from them. In many cases, the court does not even examine whether an ongoing violation exists.

Does the ECtHR Have a Ruling on UYAP Access?

Before analyzing how this practice violates the right of access to a court, it is necessary to examine whether the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has issued a decision on the AYM’s rejection of applications due to UYAP access.

Unfortunately, the ECtHR has dismissed some applications on this issue through single-judge decisions. These single-judge rulings resemble the AYM’s brief dismissals and lack substantive reasoning. However, the references cited in these decisions indicate that they rely on Grand Chamber rulings related to access to courts and procedural admissibility. Like the AYM’s rulings, these ECtHR decisions raise concerns about access to justice and procedural fairness.

Aside from these summary dismissals, the ECtHR has not yet issued a reasoned decision specifically addressing the AYM’s rejection of applications due to UYAP access. However, the court has examined UYAP’s notification mechanisms in certain cases, such as Alada v. Turkey (Application No. 67449/12). In this case, the ECtHR reviewed whether a final judgment had been uploaded to UYAP and ultimately dismissed the application on the grounds that it was filed after the six-month deadline. This decision and similar ones referencing UYAP’s operation do not directly address the AYM’s practice of rejecting applications based on UYAP access.

ECtHR Jurisprudence on the Right of Access to a Court

According to ECtHR case law, the right of access to a court is intrinsically linked to the rule of law and the prevention of arbitrariness. While this right is not absolute and may be subject to certain limitations, these restrictions must not impair the essence of the right or completely eliminate it.

Time limits for filing applications, such as the four-month deadline for ECtHR applications and the 30-day rule for AYM applications, constitute procedural limitations on access to a court. Other limitations may include court fees and jurisdictional thresholds. However, the ECtHR emphasizes that any restriction on this right must have a legal basis, pursue a legitimate aim, and maintain a fair balance between the restriction and its intended purpose.

Moreover, procedural rules must not be interpreted in an excessively formalistic or rigid manner. If the application of procedural rules effectively nullifies an individual's ability to seek judicial redress, the right of access to a court is violated. This principle is particularly relevant when determining whether an individual has had a real and effective opportunity to become aware of a judicial decision.

How the AYM’s Practice Violates the Right of Access to a Court

The AYM’s automatic dismissal of applications based on UYAP access is problematic under ECtHR jurisprudence. This practice imposes unreasonable burdens on applicants and, in many cases, prevents them from obtaining a judicial review of their claims.

Additionally, the AYM’s approach is highly formalistic and disregards the practical realities of legal representation. In many law offices, junior attorneys or administrative staff access UYAP records on behalf of senior lawyers, and the primary attorney may not immediately be informed. The assumption that every access to UYAP constitutes actual awareness of a judgment’s reasoning is legally questionable.

Furthermore, the AYM’s unrestricted access to UYAP logs, while denying the same access to applicants and their attorneys, raises concerns about equality of arms—a fundamental principle of fair trial rights under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Conclusion

In light of ECtHR case law, the AYM’s practice of dismissing applications based on UYAP access constitutes a violation of the right of access to a court. This practice lacks a clear legal basis, imposes excessive burdens on applicants, and fails to maintain procedural fairness. The AYM should reconsider this approach and issue a reasoned ruling to clarify its stance.

Applicants who wish to challenge this practice before the ECtHR should carefully document UYAP access records and procedural inconsistencies when submitting their applications. Given the ECtHR’s recent rulings on access to courts, there is a strong legal basis for arguing that the AYM’s rigid and automatic application of the UYAP access rule violates fundamental procedural rights.